We investigate the problem of secure communications in a Gaussian multiway relay channel applying the compute-and-forward scheme under usage of nested lattice codes. All nodes employ half-duplex operation and can exchange confidential messages only via an untrusted relay. The relay is assumed to be honest but curious, i.e., an eavesdropper that conforms to the system rules and applies the intended relaying scheme. We start with the general case of the single-input multiple-output L-user multiway relay channel and provide an achievable secrecy rate region under a weak secrecy criterion. We show that the securely achievable sum rate is equivalent to the difference between the computation rate and the multiple access channel (MAC) capacity. In particular, we show that all nodes must encode their messages such that the common computation rate tuple falls outside the MAC capacity region of the relay. We provide results for the single-input single-output and the multiple-input single-input L-user multiway relay channel as well as the two-way relay channel. We discuss these results and show the dependence between channel realization and achievable secrecy rate. We further compare our result to available results in the literature for different schemes and show that the proposed scheme operates close to the compute-and-forward rate without secrecy.
Weak Secrecy in the Multiway Untrusted Relay
Channel With Compute-and-Forward I. INTRODUCTION N ETWORK coding has been a promising topic in communications since introduced by Ahlswede et al. in [1] . It was shown that network coding can improve the throughput of a network and achieves the multicast capacity. For static wired networks network coding is very well investigated and some frameworks are developed [2] - [5] . On the other hand, there is a lot of ongoing work in the field of network coding for wireless networks. The properties of the wireless channel give the possibility for network coding on different layers. Practical network coding on the forwarding layer has been The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden 01069, Germany (e-mail: johannes.richter@tu-dresden.de; christian.scheunert@tu-dresden.de; sabrina.engelmann@tu-dresden.de; eduard.jorswieck@tu-dresden.de).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2015.2405903 proposed in [6] . The superposition property of the wireless channel also allows network coding on the physical layer, where the actual network coding is already done by the channel. Physical layer network coding has been investigated in [7] and gained a lot of attention. Nazer and Gastpar [8] give a survey on physical layer network coding techniques. In [9] , this approach has been further developed to the compute-and-forward scheme for which the noise is immediately removed at any relay node in the network. This is achieved by decoding linear combinations of incoming symbols at a relay instead of decoding them individually.
Compute-and-forward is based on structured codes like lattice codes that have been shown to achieve the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel capacity with lattice decoding in place of maximum-likelihood decoding in [10] . Beside reliable communication, secrecy considerations have also become more important. In cryptography the legitimate users have the secret key and are able to encode and decode the secured messages in an easy manner. The security is based on the time and complexity needed by an adversary, who does not posses the secret key, to decrypt the messages. If the time and complexity at the eavesdropper is sufficiently high in terms of currently available computational power, the message is assumed to be secure. This kind of security will get weaker with increasing computational power in the years to come. Information-theoretic secrecy on the physical layer offers unconditional secrecy and the possibility that an eavesdropper does not get any information about the exchanged messages. Wyner [11] and Csiszár and Körner [12] proved that confidential data transmission over wiretap channels can be attained by channel coding without secret keys in terms of weak and strong secrecy, respectively. The achievable secrecy rate in the presence of an untrusted relay is studied in several papers with slightly different scenarios. An early work considering a relay channel with a direct connection between source and destination, where the relay is also the wiretapper, was introduced in [13] . In [14] Huang et al. investigate different secure transmission schemes in a similar scenario. The question whether an untrusted relay is helpful if a direct connection between source and destination exists has been investigated in [15] . In [16] a Gaussian two-hop network is considered where source and destination do not have a direct connection. The destination node can help the source node by jamming the relay node with a random signal. This model is extended in [17] to a multi-hop line network.
The two-way wiretap channel, in which two nodes can only exchange messages via an untrusted relay, was first considered in [18] and [19] . It was shown that cooperative jamming, i.e., jamming with controlled interference between codewords, could reduce the eavesdropper's signal-to-noise ratio and hence improve the level of weak secrecy. In [20] it was shown that this result also holds for strong secrecy.
Most secrecy schemes are based on random codes but there is also work done in the field of secrecy through structured codes, namely lattice codes. Achievable rates for the lattice coded Gaussian wiretap channel have been developed in [21] . [21, Th. 1] proposes a lattice code construction that achieves the weak secrecy capacity. Lattice codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel have been intensively studied by Oggier et al. in [22] and references therein. They introduced the secrecy gain as a design criterion for good lattice codes for wiretap channels in [23] . It was shown by Ling et al. that lattice codes can achieve strong secrecy over the mod-Gaussian channel [24] . In [25] Ling et al. introduced the flatness factor [26] as the main tool to prove that nested lattice codes can achieve semantic security and strong secrecy over the Gaussian wiretap channel. Compute-and-forward network coding together with strong physical-layer security based on universal hash functions has been investigated in [16] . All these works focus either on a wiretap channel or on a two-hop relay network where a source node transmits via an untrusted relay to a destination. The destination may help by jamming but does not transmit a secure message itself. In [27] Kashyap et al. consider a two-way relay network with an untrusted relay where two nodes transmit one message each simultaneously via an untrusted relay. They provide an achievable power-rate region with perfect secrecy as well as strong secrecy by applying compute-and-forward.
In this work we consider an L-user relay channel where all users want to transmit a message securely to all other users. There does not exist direct connections between the users and they have to transmit via an untrusted relay which applies compute-and-forward. We investigate the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) multi-way relay channel and provide an achievable weak secrecy rate region. We prove this result and derive results for the single-input single-output (SISO) and multiple-input single-output (MISO) multi-way relay channel as well as the SISO two-way relay channel. Finally, we provide simulation results and compare our scheme against existing schemes. Our scheme has several advantages. The previous work of [27] - [29] does not consider fading channels and their results cannot be easily extended. Our scheme however takes fading into account and uses only well-known techniques like random binning for wiretap channels and compute-and-forward for two-way relaying. Further, we provide a descriptive and convincing interpretation of our result, i.e., the secrecy rate is the compute-and-forward rate region minus the multiple access channel (MAC) rate region. We also achieve a slightly higher secrecy rate when we simplify our model to the model used for example in [28] and [29] . A drawback of our scheme is the weak secrecy criterion instead of strong or even perfect secrecy. However, this disadvantage might be overcome by extending our scheme with the same techniques as in [16] and [30] , namely hashing functions, to provide strong secrecy. This will be part of future work and is not addressed in this paper.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II the system model and the coding scheme are given. Section III provides an achievable secrecy rate region for the L-user SIMO multi-way relay channel. Section IV derives from the previous result the achievable secrecy rate region for the SISO and the MISO multi-way relay channel. Section V investigates the special case of the SISO two-way relay channel. Section VI discusses the results and illustrates them with simulations. Section VII concludes the work.
A. Notation
Let log + (x) max{0, log(x)} and F p a finite field of size p, where p is a prime. We denote by x the transpose of vector x and by e i the unit vector with a one at position i and zeros elsewhere. Further we denote by H (X) the entropy of a discrete random variable X and by h(Y ) the differential entropy of a continuous random variable Y . We denote by I (X; Y ) and I (X; Y | Z ) the mutual information of X and Y and the conditional mutual information of X and Y under the condition Z , respectively. Let P(X) be the power set of set X. By δ(n) we denote a function that tends to zero if n goes to infinity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We investigate the multi-way relay-channel with half-duplex nodes as depicted in Fig. 1 . Each user node , ∈ {1, . . . , L} has a message w ∈ F k p which it wants to broadcast to all other user nodes. The user nodes do not have direct connections and have to use the help of a relay R. They exchange the messages within L phases. In the first phase all user nodes transmit their messages to the relay which tries to decode L − 1 linear combinations of the messages (MAC Phase). The relay sends these linear combinations in the remaining L − 1 phases to the user nodes (Broadcast Phases). After all L phases, the user nodes have L − 1 linear combinations and their own message. Assuming these linear combinations are linear independent, the user nodes can solve a system of linear equations to get an estimateŵ 1 , . . . ,ŵ L of all messages.
In practice it often happens that such a transmission between nodes has to use a relay that cannot be trusted. Therefore the messages have to be encoded at the user nodes such that the relay cannot decode an estimateŵ of any message w . This requirement can be formulated as the following weak secrecy condition: 
Some additional effort is needed to ensure secret message transmission as the relay gets some information due to the fact that it has to forward the messages to the user nodes. We can already see, that we can achieve secret message transmission only if we apply a relaying scheme where the relay does not need to decode messages individually. Further we need to achieve a transmission rate tuple which is not inside the MAC capacity region otherwise the relay would be able to decode the individual messages. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.
A relaying strategy which allows to fulfill these requirements is compute-and-forward, which was introduced by Nazer and Gastpar in [9] . The compute-and-forward framework is based on nested lattice codes and therefore uses structured codes instead of random coding. This allows to exploit the structure at the relay such that the relay can often recover an equation of messages at a higher rate than any individual message. As we will see later, the rates are highest when the equation coefficients closely approximate the channel coefficients. Due to space limitations we do not provide details about compute-and-forward in this paper and instead want to refer the reader to [9] for details and to [8] for an overview and a comparison to other schemes.
We provide a brief introduction to nested lattice codes in Section II-A and extend the compute-and-forward framework with secrecy constraints in Section III. We will use the compute-and-forward framework to provide an achievable secrecy rate region and consider four scenarios: 1) multiple antennas at the relay and single antenna at the user nodes, which is covered in Section III, 2) multiple antennas at the user nodes and single antenna at the relay, which is covered in Section IV, 3) single antenna at all nodes, which is covered in Section IV, and 4) the two-way relay channel with single antennas at all nodes as a special but important case, which is covered in Section V.
A. Nested Lattice Codes
The compute-and-forward framework is based on nested lattice codes and therefore we recall some lattice definitions that are used throughout the paper. For further details on lattice codes [8] , [31] - [33] .
An n-dimensional lattice ⊂ R n is a group under addition with generator matrix G ∈ R n×n :
A lattice quantizer is a mapping Q : R n → that maps a point x to the nearest lattice point in Euclidean distance,
Let the modulo operation with respect to the lattice be defined as
We call V = {x : Q (x) = 0} the fundamental Voronoi region of the lattice and denote by Vol (V) the volume of V. Two lattices C and F are called nested, if C ⊆ F . We call C the coarse lattice and F the fine lattice. A nested lattice code L is formed by taking all of the points of the fine lattice F in the fundamental Voronoi region V C of the coarse lattice C , i.e., L = F ∩ V C . The rate of a nested lattice code is given by
From [10] and [33] we know that there exist good nested lattice codes that can achieve the capacity of an AWGN channel. These nested lattice codes have been used to develop the compute-and-forward framework [8] , [9] . We utilize this framework as relaying strategy and extend it with secrecy constraints as described above.
III. SIMO MULTI-WAY RELAY CHANNEL
In the following section we investigate the SIMO channel, i.e., the relay is equipped with multiple antennas. We want to point out, that this is the most general case without assuming multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels because the SISO and MISO channel can be seen as special cases as described later. The system model for the first phase from the user nodes to the relay is shown in Fig. 2 . Each user node has a message w which it maps with an encoder
to a real-valued vector signal which is transmitted over the channel. The relay uses a pre-processing matrix B to get
Each signalỹ is processed by a decoder D to get an estimate of a linear combination of lattice codewords. We will elaborate on the details in the following subsections.
A. Channel Model 1) MAC Phase:
We denote by x ∈ R n the transmit signal of user node , ∈ {1, . . . , L}, in the first phase. Each user node has a transmit power constraint x 2 ≤ n P. We assume that the relay is equipped with η R antennas and therefore receives η R signals y
. The channel is an AWGN channel with quasi static block flat fading and is characterized by the channel matrix H ∈ R η R ×L whose entries h i j are the fading coefficients from the j -th user to the i -th antenna at the relay. Note that by this representation the i -th row of H, denoted by h i , represents the channel from user i to the relay. The channel model for the first phase is then given by
where X ∈ R L×n is a matrix whose -th row is the transpose transmit vector x of user . Further, Y ∈ R η R ×n is a matrix whose i -th row represents the received data stream y The relay decodes L − 1 linear combinations of the original messages and encodes them with a capacity achieving code. The L − 1 codewords are then sent to all users simultaneously in the remaining L − 1 phases. Note that for these phases we have a broadcast channel and we assume reciprocal channels which are constant over all L phases. Therefore the rate constraints for the last L − 1 phases are given by the capacity of the individual point-to-point channels. Due to the uplinkdownlink duality for reciprocal channels and equal power constraints [34, Ch. 10.3] , these are always larger or equal to the MAC rate region and the first phase will be the limiting phase. Therefore we will focus on that phase for developing the achievable rate of the whole system.
2) Broadcast Phases: We denote by x
∈ R n the transmit signals of the relay in phases 1 to L, respectively. The relay has a transmit power constraint x (i) r 2 ≤ n P, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Please note that the relay does not send anything in the first phase and therefore x (1) r = 0. We assume that all channels are reciprocal and constant over all L phases. Each user node receives a signal
in the i -th phase, where ω r is the beamforming vector at the relay and z (i) ∼ N (0, I n×n ) is white Gaussian noise. Please note that the user nodes do not receive anything in the first phase and therefore y (1) = 0 because we assume no direct connection between the user nodes.
3) Channel State Information:
The relay needs to know all channels between itself and the user nodes. The user nodes on the other hand need to know only the effective channel between themselves and the relay. That means user needs to know ω r h .
B. Encoding
Each user node chooses a message w ∈ F k p i.i.d. from a uniform distribution over the index set {1, 2, . . . , 2 n R s }. For the ease of simplicity we assume equal message length k at all users, which implies equal secrecy rates for all users. If this is not the case, we would have to extend the nested lattice code chain as described in [9] . Each message gets mapped onto a lattice code L = F ∩ V C where the second moment of C equals P such that the power constraint is satisfied. Each user node uses the same codebook
. Similar to wiretap codes, this codebook is randomly binned into 2 n R s bins, where each bin contains 2 n R d codewords. The secret message w gets mapped to the bins and the lattice codeword t is chosen from that bin according to a uniform distribution. Further we add some dither u that is uniform distributed over V C and known by the relay. This dithering gives statistical properties of the transmitted signal needed to achieve the compute-and-forward rate [9] . To make sure that the transmit signal fulfills the power constraint, we build the modulo with respect to the coarse lattice. We get the following n-dimensional transmit vector at node
With this encoding scheme we get the following rates: a) R d is the rate of the randomly chosen messages within a bin, b) R s is the secret message rate, and
is the transmit rate of the user nodes. Note that compute-and-forward implies the same rate at all L user nodes because a maximum rate equal to the computation rate is achievable. It will turn out by the secrecy analysis that the information leakage is symmetric for all L user nodes.
C. Relay Strategy
The relay uses compute-and-forward [9] as relaying strategy and tries to decode L − 1 linear combinationsv 1 , . . . ,v L−1 of the transmitted lattice codewords as shown in Fig. 2 . It uses a preprocessing matrix B to get the optimal signals prior to decoding. The achievable computation rate is then given by [9] , [35] 
where a is the coefficient vector for the -th linear combination and b is the preprocessing vector corresponding to the -th row in B. The optimal preprocessing matrix for a given coefficient matrix A = (a 1 , . . . , a L−1 ) and the resulting rates have been found in [35] . We use these results and provide them in the following for completeness.
The optimal preprocessing matrix is given by
Plugging Eq. (13) in Eq. (12), we get
with V ∈ R L×L being the right eigenmatrix of H and D ∈ R L×L being a diagonal matrix with elements
where λ i is the i -th eigenvalue of H H . All L − 1 linear combinations have to be decodable at the relay to allow all L users to decode all original messages. Therefore the resulting achievable rate of all L users is
To get the highest possible rates we need to find a set of full rank equations with coefficient matrix A ∈ Z L−1×L . Because all L users need to be able to decode all messages, we additionally require the rows of A to be linear independent of all vectors e where e is the unit vector with a one at the -th position and zeros elsewhere. This results in the following optimization problem
where
There are several algorithms which find the best coefficient vector [36] - [39] . These algorithms need to be extended to fulfill the following additional constraints:
• for all = 1, . . . , L, all L − 1 coefficient vectors need to be linear independent of e .
• we need to find the L − 1 best coefficient vectors and not only the best one. For example, the algorithm of [37] can be easily extended to solve Eq. (17). We used this algorithm to provide the simulation results in Section VI.
In [9] it was shown that reliable communication can be achieved as long as
In the second phase the relay maps all decoded linear combinationsv ∈ F ∩ V C to an index of the set {1, 2, . . . , 2 n R r } and uses a capacity achieving code to encode and an optimal beamforming vector to transmit to the user nodes with rate
where ω r is the multicast beamforming vector at the relay. An efficient way to obtain the optimal beamforming vector can be found in [40] .
D. Decoding at the User Nodes
In each of the L − 1 phases, each user node receives an index of the set {1, 2, . . . , 2 n R r }. They can decode as long as the transmission rate from relay to user is less than the point-to-point capacity of the channels, which is given in Eq. (19) . If decoded successfully they know the lattice point v ∈ F ∩ V C being transmitted by the relay.
User can decode the original lattice points from the other users by solving the following system of linear equations
and
User already knows t because this is its own message. Please note that the users get the lattice points without the dither because the relay already subtracted it. User obtains an estimate of all lattice points t i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} bŷ
contains all estimates of transmitted lattice codewords at user . After solving forT each user knows all L lattice points. If the lattice point is known, the message and the bin is known. Therefore each user gets all L messages. To achieve reliable communication within all L phases we obtain a rate constraint for the user nodes given by
From the lattice code construction in Section II-A and Eq. (25) we get the following constraint for the weak secrecy rate R s
To ensure that the relay will not get any information about individual messages, the rate R d has to be chosen appropriately. This will be addressed in the next section.
E. Achievable Secrecy Rate Region
In this section we provide an achievable secrecy rate region and give a short interpretation. The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 1 (Achievable Secrecy Rate): Consider a multiway relay channel with L users and η R antennas at the relay. The channel is characterized by the matrix H whose entries h i j represent the fading coefficient from the j -th user to the i -th antenna at the relay. All nodes can only communicate via the relay and have no direct links. Each node has a transmit power constraint x i
2 ≤ n P, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r }. Then the weak secrecy rate region is given by
..,L−1} R(H, a i ) with a i chosen according to programming problem Eq. (17).

Remark 1:
We give a detailed interpretation and discussion of the theorem in Section VI.
F. Power Allocation
Every user node has a power constraint x 2 ≤ n P. However, it is not always optimal to send at full power and therefore the transmit power for each user node needs to be optimized. We define a diagonal matrix
which contains the square roots of the individual transmit powers of the user nodes. Further, we define the effective channel asH = H P tr . This results in the following optimization problem
with V being the right singular matrix ofH and D being a diagonal matrix with elements
where λ i is the i -th eigenvalue ofH H . This problem is hard to solve because of the non-linearity and non-convexity. The scope of this paper does not include an analytic result or an algorithm. For the simulations we use a grid search algorithm to obtain the optimal power allocation.
IV. SISO AND MISO MULTI-WAY RELAY CHANNEL
In this section we provide the achievable secrecy rates for the following cases:
• single antenna at the source nodes and the relay; SISO, • multiple antennas at the source nodes and single antenna at the relay; MISO. The result for the SISO case can be directly derived from the SIMO case. Further, we show in Section IV-B that the result for the MISO case can be derived from the SISO case.
A. SISO
The results for the SISO case can be derived directly from Theorem 1 where the channel matrix reduces to a vector.
Corollary 1: Consider a multi-way relay channel with L users and single antennas at all nodes. The channel from user to the relay is characterized by the coefficient h ∈
R with h = (h 1 , .
. . , h L ) . All nodes can only communicate via the relay and have no direct links. Each node has a transmit power constraint x i
2 ≤ n P, ∀i ∈ {1, . .
. , L, r }. Then the weak secrecy rate region is given by
· h is the effective channel and P ≤ P is the transmit power at user .
B. MISO
For the MISO case we assume no cooperation at the source nodes in order to choose the beamforming vectors. Therefore it is optimal to use maximum ratio transmission (MRT) in the direction of the channel. This leaves us with an reduced optimization problem where we only have to choose the optimal power allocation. The effective channel is
where h is the channel vector from user to the relay and ω is the beamforming vector with ω ≤ 1 for user . Using MRT we get
The secrecy rate is now equivalent to the one in the SISO case and we get the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Consider a multi-way relay channel with L users and η T antennas at the user nodes. The relay is equipped with a single antenna. The channel from user to the relay is characterized by the vector h ∈ R η T . All nodes can only communicate via the relay and have no direct links.
Each node has a transmit power constraint x i 2 ≤ n P, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r }. Then the weak secrecy rate region is given by
.
is the effective channel and P ≤ P is the transmit power at user .
V. 2-USER CASE: TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL
In this section we consider the special case of two users which is also known as the two-way relay channel. We restrict ourselves to the SISO case where all nodes are equipped with single antennas. This system model is quite common in literature and one can find a lot of work on the achievable rate without secrecy [41] - [43] as well as with secrecy [16] , [18] , [20] , [44] , [45] . Most of the work models the two-way relay channel as a wiretap channel where the second user is helping the first user by jamming the eavesdropper, i.e., the relay [28] , [29] . This differs from our work because we assume that both users transmit a secure message simultaneously. Further, most of the work so far considers the two-way relay channel without fading and those results cannot be directly extended to fading channels.
However, to be able to compare our result to existing schemes we relax our model to match the one assumed in [28] . That is, user 1 transmits a secure message to user 2 via an untrusted relay. User 2 helps by sending a jamming signal to the relay. The main difference to our more general model is the fact, that the message of the second user does not need to be secure. Further, we assume that the channel coefficients are equal and set to 1. With this relaxed model we get the following secrecy rate.
Theorem 2: Consider a two-way relay channel with fading coefficients h 1 = h 2 = 1 and equal power constraint P. The following secrecy rate is achievable with a cooperative jammer
The following proof does not necessarily require that the channel fading coefficients are 1. Therefore we provide the proof with fading coefficients and choose them to be 1 at the end to get the result of Theorem 2. The proof follows the same steps as the proof for the L-user multi-way relay channel, except that we have the following reduced secrecy requirement:
We start to bound the conditional entropy of the message W 1 given the received signal Y r at the relay, (36) where we used Fano's inequality to bound the last term in Eq. (33) . This is possible because the size of each bin is kept small enough such that given W 1 , the eavesdropper/the relay can determine X 1 from its received signal Y r [28] .
We now need a lower bound on the mutual information between X 1 and Y r .
The last inequality follows from the fact that a normal distribution maximizes the entropy under an average power constraint. The last term can be expressed as follows,
where h(Z r ) = 1 2 log 2 (2πe). From [10] we know that
If we put Eqs. (38) to (40) into Eq. (36) we get
Because R s + R d ≤ R CF to ensure reliable communication, we get the following result for the achievable secrecy rate, Choosing h 1 = h 2 = 1 and the optimal coefficients a 1 = a 2 = 1 we get
and the result of Theorem 2. This concludes the proof. In the following we compare our result for the two-way relay channel to other approaches and illustrate the results in Fig. 3 . The first result is a scheme by He and Yener which provides a weak secrecy result [28] , i.e.,
This result is extended in [30] for strong secrecy. The achievable secrecy rate is shown to be the same as for weak secrecy by utilizing a hash function. Please note that we can extend our result as well with a hash function to get a result for strong secrecy. This will be the topic of future research and is not considered in this paper. The second scheme is provided by Kashyap et al. in [27] . The achievable secrecy rates are for perfect and strong secrecy, respectively. Observe that
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss and illustrate Theorem 1, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2. It is interesting to note, that the achievable secrecy rate is the difference between the achievable compute-and-forward sum rate and the sum capacity of the MAC. This means, we get a secrecy rate greater than zero if the compute-and-forward rate region is larger than the MAC capacity region. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 for the two user case, where we plotted the achievable rate regions for the channel coefficients (0.9, 0.8) and a transmit power constraint MAC capacity region (blue line) with achievable compute-andforward rates for different coefficient vectors a (red dots) for h = (0.9, 0.8) and P = 10 Watt. of P = 10 Watt. The dots in Fig. 4 mark the corner points of the achievable compute-and-forward rate regions for different linear combinations. The solid line illustrates the border of the MAC capacity region. As one can see, a rate greater than the MAC sum capacity is only achievable for a single coefficient vector, in this example a = (1, 1) . In general there can be at most one point or several linear dependent points outside the MAC capacity region. Otherwise the relay would be able to decode the single messages by solving a system of linear equations which contradicts the MAC capacity definition. From this illustration we see, that it is only possible to transmit secure messages via the relay, if the source nodes transmit at a rate outside the MAC capacity. This ensures that the relay cannot decode the single messages but only a linear combination, if the compute-and-forward rate is higher than the MAC sum capacity. In Fig. 4 it is optimal to transmit at full power. In Fig. 5 we show that this is not always the case. Therefore we plotted the achievable rate regions for the channel coefficients (0.8, 0.5) and a transmit power constraint of P = 10 Watt. As one can see, optimizing the power means reducing the transmit power for one user node. Because the channel coefficients of the effective channel are then closer to each other, we achieve a higher computation rate for the coefficient a = (1, 1) while reducing the MAC sum capacity at the same time. We want to stress here the uncommon behavior that it is possible to increase the secrecy rate by reducing the transmit power.
A. Achievability of Positive Secrecy Rates
The achievable compute-and-forward sum rate is twice the computation rate at the relay. The achievable computation rate depends highly on the channel coefficients because the compute-and-forward framework tries to approximate the real valued channel coefficients with integer valued network coding coefficients. This means that there does not always exist a network coding coefficient vector with an achievable computation rate which is larger than the MAC capacity. We show in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 the achievable secrecy rate for different channel realizations in a two user scenario, i.e., the two-way relay channel with a single antenna at all nodes. One can see that the achievable secrecy rate reaches its highest values if the channel coefficients are equal. One can also see that small channel coefficient values do not achieve positive secrecy rates. This behavior can be compensated in party by adjusting the power allocation such that the effective channel coefficients are close to each other. Unfortunately, when we assume that the channel coefficients are distributed by h i ∼ N (0, 1), the small channel coefficients occur with higher probability. The question arises how many channel realizations result in a positive secrecy rate when we draw the channel coefficients from a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. The result for the SISO case without optimized power allocation is shown in Fig. 8 where we used 10,000 i.i.d. channel realizations. One can see that only in the two-way relay channel we achieve positive secrecy rates for a reasonable amount of channel realizations. This might be a depressing result but we can improve the performance by optimizing the transmit power and introducing multiple antennas. The result for a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 5 dB is shown in Fig. 9 . One can see that alone by optimizing the power allocation in the SISO case we increase number of the channel realizations resulting in a positive secrecy rate from 18.19 % to 52.1 %. Introducing multiple antennas at the source nodes results in 100 % of positive secrecy rates. Introducing multiple antennas at the relay is contra-beneficial because we give the eavesdropper more degrees of freedom. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an achievable secrecy rate region for the L-user relay channel where all nodes want to transmit messages securely via an untrusted relay. We have shown that the proposed coding strategy, based on the compute-and-forward framework, supports simultaneous secure communications. The proposed achievable secrecy rate is the difference between the MAC sum capacity and the computation rate of the compute-and-forward framework. We have provided a proof for the achievability of the secrecy rate region and have discussed this result. We have seen that this scheme performs quit good in the 2-user case, commonly known as the two-way untrusted relay channel. Therefore we investigated this scenario in detail and showed the dependency of the performance on the channel realizations. We showed that with the introduction of multiple antennas at the source nodes and the optimization of the transmit power we can significantly increase the secrecy rate.
APPENDIX
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 1. An overview over all random variables is provided in Table I .
Proof: For the achievability of the secrecy rate region we must show that the weak secrecy condition in Eq. 
For the ease of readability we define the following sets of vectors of random variables: 
Please note that W is independent of U and therefore
By using the fact that 
First we calculate I (X ; Y | W, U ) = H (X | W, U ) − H (X | Y, W, U ). When the messages W are given, the only uncertainty that remains in X comes from the binning. Because each user node ∈ {1, . . . , L} chooses independently a codeword out of a bin of size 2 n R d equally likely for each secret message, we have that
Further we get that
if L · R d ≥ 1 2 log det(I + P H H ) due to Fano's inequality. Next we calculate I (X ; Y | U ), which can be expressed in terms of entropy, i.e.,
We use the fact that the normal distribution maximizes the entropy for an average power constraint to get an upper bound on the first term. 
Putting Eq. (59) and Eq. (60) into Eq. (58) yields
Putting all together we obtain the following lower bound. 
With Eq. (62) we have a lower bound on the right-hand side of Eq. (54). We can use this bound to obtain the following rate constraint:
To allow reliable communication we know from Eq. (25) that R s + R d ≤ R CF . Therefore we get the following weak secrecy rate
This concludes the proof.
